Rule set sha256:8425ad0448a8
rego-art15-ipi-005
One rule of the rule set with digest 8425ad0448a8b5d482b8dabfc7bdd33c8c32cbd5f3b9c1e36e71a8a905fbd467. An audit record that names this digest and this rule was decided by the rule as shown here. Every rule in this set.
rules/rego/complyedge/prompt_security/sysprompt_leak.rego
- Citation
- Not stated in the rule file.
- Condition
- Text that tries to make an AI reveal its system prompt, hidden instructions or configuration.
- Layer 1 detects
- in any letter case, reveal, print, repeat, show, display, output, "tell me", reproduce, echo or recite (optionally followed by "me", then optionally "your", "the" or "all of your"), then "system prompt", "initial instruction(s)", "initial prompt", hidden, secret, original or confidential instruction(s), prompt or rules, or "prompt verbatim"; and "what are", "what were" or "what is" "your" (optionally exact, full or complete) followed by initial, original, system or hidden, then instruction(s), prompt, rules or directive(s). It does not match a request for the AI's configuration in other words. It matches wording, not meaning: it does not read who is asking, so it fires on the operator's own request ("show the system prompt in the settings panel"), and it misses a leak request worded any other way. Whether the text tries to extract the AI's hidden instructions is judged in Layer 2. Deterministic OPA/Rego leaf so this indirect/direct prompt-injection pattern blocks on the /v1/check hot path (previously YAML/TrustLint only, retired from /v1/check). Pattern ported verbatim from the vetted universal YAML corpus.
- Condition type
- Not stated in the rule file.
- Status in the file
- approved