Rule set sha256:a7e715b79299

PROMPT_SECURITY_EXFIL_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_001

One rule of the rule set with digest a7e715b792994b004a7cc9714100077fad036164172ce42812ed396af0b727f5. An audit record that names this digest and this rule was decided by the rule as shown here. Every rule in this set.

RulePROMPT_SECURITY_EXFIL_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_001
Rule versionf1157949038597c62b2b4b32fade3b58787da902cf82735b314c4619e8a67fe0
ProvisionRegulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 15(5)
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/art_15/par_5/oj
ApprovalApproved
Approved by Leo Celis (via agent review per §5.1 amendment v1.1) on 2026-10-22

rules/regulations/universal/prompt_security/exfil_system_prompt_leak.yaml

Citation
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 15(5): High-risk AI systems shall be resilient against attempts by unauthorised third parties to alter their use, outputs or performance by exploiting system vulnerabilities. The technical solutions aiming to ensure the cybersecurity of high-risk AI systems shall be appropriate to the relevant circumstances and the risks. The technical solutions to address AI specific vulnerabilities shall include, where appropriate, measures to prevent, detect, respond to, resolve and control for attacks trying to manipulate the training data set (data poisoning), or pre-trained components used in training (model poisoning), inputs designed to cause the AI model to make a mistake (adversarial examples or model evasion), confidentiality attacks or model flaws.
Condition
Covers data-exfiltration via injection: attempts to make the model reveal its system prompt, hidden/initial instructions, or safety rules verbatim. EU AI Act Article 15. OWASP LLM01 / LLM06 (sensitive information disclosure).
Layer 1 detects
in any letter case, reveal, print, repeat, show, display, output, "tell me", reproduce, echo or recite (optionally followed by "me", then optionally "your", "the" or "all of your"), then "system prompt", "initial instruction(s)", "initial prompt", hidden, secret, original or confidential instruction(s), prompt or rules, or "prompt verbatim"; and "what are", "what were" or "what is" "your" (optionally exact, full or complete) followed by initial, original, system or hidden, then instruction(s), prompt, rules or directive(s). It does not match a request for the AI's configuration in other words. It matches wording, not meaning: it does not read who is asking, so it fires on the operator's own request ("show the system prompt in the settings panel"), and it misses a leak request worded any other way. Whether the text tries to extract the AI's hidden instructions is judged in Layer 2.
Condition type
regex
Status in the file
approved