Rule set sha256:ced554567772
rego-art15-ipi-005
One rule of the rule set with digest ced554567772bc778cb2c7761a23d2775e31500d6b0d887c23c750017ee02779. An audit record that names this digest and this rule was decided by the rule as shown here. Every rule in this set.
| Rule | rego-art15-ipi-005 |
|---|---|
| Rule version | 841a69e992f5f295496fd080d0151b2f14c6710321744bfbf4a35ee78fc0af63 |
| Provision | Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 15(5) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/art_15/par_5/oj |
| Approval | Not approved |
rules/rego/complyedge/prompt_security/sysprompt_leak.rego
- Citation
- Not stated in the rule file.
- Condition
- Text that tries to make an AI reveal its system prompt, hidden instructions or configuration.
- Layer 1 detects
- in any letter case, reveal, print, repeat, show, display, output, "tell me", reproduce, echo or recite (optionally followed by "me", then optionally "your", "the" or "all of your"), then "system prompt", "initial instruction(s)", "initial prompt", hidden, secret, original or confidential instruction(s), prompt or rules, or "prompt verbatim"; and "what are", "what were" or "what is" "your" (optionally exact, full or complete) followed by initial, original, system or hidden, then instruction(s), prompt, rules or directive(s). It does not match a request for the AI's configuration in other words. It matches wording, not meaning: it does not read who is asking, so it fires on the operator's own request ("show the system prompt in the settings panel"), and it misses a leak request worded any other way. Whether the text tries to extract the AI's hidden instructions is judged in Layer 2. Deterministic OPA/Rego leaf so this indirect/direct prompt-injection pattern blocks on the /v1/check hot path (previously YAML/TrustLint only, retired from /v1/check). Pattern ported verbatim from the vetted universal YAML corpus.
- Condition type
- Not stated in the rule file.
- Status in the file
- review